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ABSTRACT
Innovation is often regarded as uniformly positive. This
paper shows that the role of innovation in quality
improvement is more complicated. The authors identify
three known paradoxes of innovation in healthcare.
First, some innovations diffuse rapidly, yet are of
unproven value or limited value, or pose risks, while
other innovations that could potentially deliver benefits
to patients remain slow to achieve uptake. Second,
participatory, cooperative approaches may be the best
way of achieving sustainable, positive innovation, yet
relying solely on such approaches may disrupt positive
innovation. Third, improvement clearly depends upon
change, but change always generates new challenges.
Quality improvement systems may struggle to keep up
with the pace of innovation, yet evaluation of innovation
is often too narrowly focused for the system-wide
effects of new practices or technologies to be
understood. A new recognition of the problems of
innovation is proposed and it is argued that new
approaches to addressing them are needed.
INTRODUCTION
Innovation in healthcare can take many
forms, ranging from drug therapies, surgical
procedures, devices and tests, through to new
forms of health professional training, patient
education, and management, financing and
service delivery models. ‘Innovation’ is widely
assumed to be positive in its effects, to the
extent that the term ‘innovative’ usually
expresses unqualified praise. In this paper,
we seek a critical reappraisal of the role of
innovation in quality improvement in
healthcare. Using a range of disciplinary
perspectives (rather than offering an exten-
sive literature review), we identify the trade-
off problems associated with innovation, and
we challenge practitioners, organisations and
institutions to recognise and confront the
paradoxes of innovation.
FIRST PARADOX OF INNOVATION: UPTAKE OF
THE DUBIOUS, REJECTION OF THE GOOD
The first paradox of innovation is the well-
known problem that some new practices
enjoy rapid uptake and diffusion throughout
health systems, even when they are of limited
benefit or unproven efficacy, or represent
risks to patients, while other innovations that
could secure better outcomes for patients
never make it to the bedside.
The reasons why unproven innovations are
sometimes rapidly adopted and implemented
are becoming better understood.1 Some are
rather like consumer fadsda new technology
or therapy generates the excitement of
newness and ‘must-have’deven before the
evidence base has been firmly established.
For example, percutaneous bladder neck
suspension for stress incontinence was
initially hailed as a great success and came
into widespread use, but subsequent long-
term follow-up of trials showed very disap-
pointing outcomes.2 Some innovations
diffuse rapidly because they offer hope in
otherwise intractable or desperate situations
where denying an available therapy is diffi-
cult. Examples include the use of laetrile
for cancer, which, despite its enthusiastic
promotion during the 1970s, lacked evidence
of effectivenessdand indeed there is some
evidence of toxicity.3 Some innovations are
adopted and implemented because they
have considerable face validity or intuitive
appeal as plausible solutions, but later turn
out to be wrong. Well-known examples
include the use of antiarrhythmic agents in
the treatment of myocardial infarction, and
human albumin in treatment of critically ill
patients.4 Organisations may also adopt
innovations as a defence against anxiety, to
guard against criticism that any failing was
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due to non-adoption. The widespread use of early
warning scores and rapid response teams for deterio-
rating patients, despite only very equivocal evidence of
benefit,5 may be an example of this.
The uptake of many dubious interventions relies on
a form of magical thinking, where doing something is
seen as better than doing nothing. The language used
to promote innovations can be strongly implicated in
such thinking. Terms such as ‘breakthrough,’ ‘radical,’
‘new’ and even ‘innovative’ can stimulate consumer
instincts, including those related to anticipated decision
regretdwhere patients (and doctors) are reluctant to
turn down any chance of possible improvement, even if
there is only a small chance of success.6
Of course, rapid diffusion of innovation is also driven
by profit-seeking behaviour. The engines of innovation
may be commercial organisations prepared to resort to
inventing ‘diseases’ (such as social anxiety disorder),
repackaging cheap treatments as expensive ones for
new markets (eg, using an expensive form of the cheap
colon cancer drug Avastin for treating macular degen-
eration) or bringing to market technologies that offer
only limited advantages over existing treatments.
Many new devicesdparticularly diagnostic onesdneed
do no more than demonstrate that they comply with
basic safety standards, and produce no evidence of
efficacy. But organisations that stand to profit from the
use of a new intervention may use sophisticated and
aggressive marketing strategies, often enlisting patient
pressure along the way and pressing political buttons to
garner support. Clamour for therapies from desperate
patients can be difficult to resist, as every health system
in the world has discovered. Once institutions have
invested in a new intervention, they then have a vested
interest in recovering the costs, as the example of proton
beam therapy for prostate cancer shows.
Diffusion of innovation without proven efficacy intro-
duces several threats to quality improvement. Most
obviously, such innovation may pose risks to patients.
More insidiously, the deflection of effort and investment
is a huge opportunity cost for health systems that
undermines efforts to improve services. Further, the
innovation may disrupt or displace procedures in areas
that have been targets of quality improvement.
A mirror image to the problem of innovations without
proven efficacy is the failure of diffusion of innovations
that are of proven value. Here again, the evidence about
what causes some efficacious innovations to remain
unwrapped in the box is emerging. Some innovationsd
for example, pelvic floor exercises or improved hand
hygiene practicesdhave little of the glamour of new
technologies and generate little excitement. Others
require a level of investment, training or reinforcement
that healthcare organisations or practitioners may
struggle to achieve. Some are simply tedious and
inconvenient, or threaten existing interests. Many lack
a well-funded advocate with access to modern marketing
techniques and budgets; when there is no manufacturer
who stands to profit, promotion may be lacklustre. Some
fall victim to the problem that when there are plenty of
areas where coercive forces are at work (eg, targets or
standards against which performance will be rewarded),
the spotlight naturally slips off those that are not the
focus of such measures.
The appeal of the new and the rejection of the dull
cannot be explained by focusing solely on individual and
organisational behaviours. Complex systemic processes
and institutional forces are at work. For example, deci-
sions about which clinical research is done and which is
published (and where) are implicated in determining
whether an intervention ever comes to attention, what
kinds of attention it gets and whether it gets adopted or
implemented. Publication bias, which causes interven-
tions to appear more useful than they really are, is just
one of these systemic effects.
SECOND PARADOX OF INNOVATION: THE WISDOM AND
FAILINGS OF DEMOCRACY
The second paradox of innovation is that one of the
most effective ways of ensuring the implementation of
new technologies, therapies and techniques is by
working cooperatively with the professional groups
expected to engage in implementing it, but relying solely
on cooperation may also be the most effective way of
killing an innovation.
Theoretical work on participatory governance has
drawn on Charles Lindblom’s arguments about the
‘intelligence of democracy’ to emphasise the benefits of
involving those likely to be affected by change and with
relevant knowledge in decisions about innovation and
implementation.7 Participatory, collaborative forms of
decision-making and action may not only enable better
informed decisions but also foster social learning and
more sustainable outcomes, unite and motivate those
with a commitment to solving problems, increase the
chances of detecting the potential for innovation, and
improve people’s willingness to accept change.8 There
is now increasing recognition of, and excitement
about, the role of self-organising, self-governing
networks in securing desirable outcomes in healthcare
and elsewhere.9e12 Within healthcare, there has been
particular interest in using a social movements approach
as an alternative to programmatic approaches that
emphasise centrally led, planned programmes of
change. Social movements are characterised by their
self-directing nature, their use of informal systems and
the self-management of change.13
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Such approaches may be especially promising in their
ability to address well-known problems of attempts
to change practice among professionals, who may
strongly prefer to take their ‘directions for performance’
from within rather than outside their professional
group14 and be capable of subverting administrative
fiats and managerial instructions.15 16 Social movements
and other forms of community-based participatory
approaches, with their emphasis on cooperation and
norms of reciprocity, may be more likely to enable
collaborative activity to be maintained long term,17 and
thus promote sustainability of innovation. The strengths
of such approaches to professional work are reinforced
by their continuities with longstanding collegial struc-
tures, and the corresponding centrality of the commu-
nity principle in the organisation and experience of
professional work.18
However, the counter to the ‘wisdom of democracy’ is
the failings of democracy. Group-based, cooperative
efforts may be undermined by those who fail to
engage with, or commit to, the collaborative activity,
and by the risk that individuals will substitute their
own goals for those of the group, so that the collabo-
ration is undermined by individual or group interests.18
Professional boundaries, particularly between different
disciplines and occupational groups, may create
barriers to proper collaboration. Social movements can
become sites of struggle and contestation, and may
never succeed in fully delivering their aims. For
instance, the evidence-based medicine (EBM) move-
ment, including the founding of the Cochrane Collab-
oration, can be understood as a social movement19 that
sought to respond to the problem we identified in
Paradox 1: that some treatments known to work are
ignored, and other treatments not shown to work
get used. Though this particular social movement
has enjoyed enormous success, Paradox 1 has not
disappeared, and the command of EBM over the
hearts and minds of many clinicians has been, at best,
partial.
Some of the reasons for variable success of participa-
tory, grass-roots approaches lie in the difficulties of
creating arenas and opportunities for clinicians to
collaborate and the antagonism of bureaucratic and
professional structures to so doing. These are important
problems, since those leading and managing networks
must elicit support through building coalitions and
forging agreement, sometimes in the face of local
opposition or inertia,20 as well as creating environments
where productive, goal-directed relationships and inter-
actions are most likely to occur. They must also be able to
manage the changing nature of the collaborative effort
over time, and address the risk that collaborations may
start out with considerable enthusiasm, but gradually
develop less helpful features including competition
and rivalry between different members of the network,
fragmentation or duplication of effort, emergence of
disruptive hierarchies, or diminishing commitment and
ability to secure resources.17 Professional groups are
themselves susceptible to persuasion and manipulation
by commercial forcesdeither directly or indirectlydthat
may undermine their ability to behave in the interests of
the public good. If innovation is to be managed appro-
priately in healthcare, there is an urgent need to find
approaches that can combine the benefits of coopera-
tive, participatory approaches with other regulatory
techniques.
THIRD PARADOX OF INNOVATION: HEALTH SYSTEMS ARE
NEVER ABLE TO KEEP UP
The third paradox of innovation is that improvement
requires change, but change always generates new chal-
lenges. Quality improvement systems are rarely able to
keep pace with innovation; innovation disrupts. For
example, the rise of stenting procedures by cardiologists
means that many patients previously managed by
cardiothoracic surgeons (bypass surgery) are now
being cared for by different personnel in different
physical configurations of healthcare settings, and
thus a whole new set of quality challenges arises.
Further, people improvise, change their habits and
reconfigure their work practices in response to new
technologies, often in unpredictable ways.21 By the time
quality-assurance systems have caught up with the ‘new’
modality, things have already moved on yet again.
Having a cycle of renewal and reinvention creates
ongoing organisational turbulence and may diminish
organisational and practitioner enthusiasm for quality
improvement.
This problem is intensified by the ongoing failure of
the dominant evaluation paradigm. This continues to
confine evaluation narrowly to the intervention that is
the direct focus of the evaluation, rather than consid-
ering the systemic effects and unintended consequences
of interventions. For instance, a typical evaluation
seeking to assess whether a new technique for moni-
toring patients at risk of critical illness will tend to
determine the effects of the technique only for that class
of patients. The risks the system introduces elsewhere
(such as the impact of prioritising monitoring over other
goals of healthcare) thus remain unknown. Social
science work is needed alongside intervention studies
not only to help assess unintended consequences, but
also to provide vital evidence about issues relating to
adoption, implementation and optimisation in different
contexts.
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CONCLUSION: ADDRESSING THE PROBLEMS OF
INNOVATION
Rationality is a contested concept in the social sciences,
but perhaps the most influential approach derives from
the work of psychologists Tversky and Kahnemann, who
specify rationality in terms of consistency and coher-
ence.22 Defined in that sense, the paradoxes we have
outlined help to explain why it makes little sense to
think of rationality as the main driver of innovation in
health systems. Non-rational collective decisions should
perhaps be considered the norm rather than the outlier:
when health systems are faced with continual external
and internal pressures for innovation combined with
strong emotional, economic and political forces, the
ability of those systems to engage in rational debate and
planning is undermined. Yet the need to avoid unnec-
essary innovations and manage the transition for neces-
sary innovations is among the most important challenges
facing health systems today.
If a new technology or technique is being considered
for use, health systems should consider the principles of
quality improvement as they are introduced rather than
waiting for the inevitable problems to occur (box 1).
Thus, for a new surgical procedure, we might ask:
i. What is the evidence that the procedure improves
outcomes in other settings, while recognising the
complexities of generalisation?23
ii. What support, training and systems will be needed
before it can be introduced?
iii. How should we monitor the introduction?
By asking the first question, we may avoid the many
disruptive innovations that are fashions rather than true
improvements. By asking the second and third ques-
tions, we will smooth the transition. By thinking carefully
and critically about when we should regard health
systems reforms as ‘clinical experiments’ (and thus
requiring the same level of evidence and oversight as
other clinical interventions24) and when we should
regard reforms as a normal part of the continuous
experiential learning required to improve healthcare, we
remain alert to the possible impactsdboth negative and
positivedof innovation.
These are all difficult challenges and require courage
in the face of uncertainty, in the face of vested interests,
in the face of immense political, patient and provider-led
appetites and pressures, and in the face of financial
squeeze and organisational and institutional inertia.
Perhaps most importantly, these challenges require the
courage to fail and learn.25 In summary, quality
improvement work needs to reconsider the role of
innovation. In the long term, most elements in
any medical system will be discarded and replaced. If
we focus on making wise and courageous choices of
innovations, introducing them with quality improvement
principles in mind, then our future healthcare systems
will better serve patients.
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